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Dada una economía con producción, definimos un juego de sindicatos considerando 
el comportamiento estratégico de éstos en la oferta de factores de producción que 
están bajo su control. Nos referimos a los equilibrios de Nash de este juego como 
Equilibrio de Sindicatos. Analizamos, en primer lugar, situaciones en las que el 
desempleo de factores puede ser sustentado como un Equilibrio de Sindicatos, con 
la conclusión de que el nivel de desempleo de los factores, en el Equilibrio de 
Sindicatos, depende de condiciones de naturaleza tecnológica. Apuntamos, por 
tanto, a una fuente de desempleo que difiere de las que han sido sugeridas por la 
literatura. A continuación probamos un resultado límite que muestra que a medida 
que el poder de negociación (de manipulación de ofertas)  de los sindicatos 
disminuye, la cantidad de desempleo de factores también lo hace, llegando, en el 
límite, a ofertarse todo de todos los factores. En este caso límite el Equilibrio de 
Sindicatos es una asignación walrasiana. 
 




Given a production economy, we define a trade union game by considering 
strategic behavior on factor supplies. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game 
as trade union equilibria.  First we analyze  situations under which unemployment 
of factors are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemployment  
depends on  technological conditions.  In this line, we suggest a source of 
unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the related 
literature. Then, we state a limit result which shows that when the market power of 
trade unions decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria 
converges to the walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors.  
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1Abstract. Given a production economy, we deﬁne a trade union
game by considering strategic behavior on factor supplies. We re-
fer to the Nash equilibria of this game as trade union equilibria.
First we analyze situations under which unemployment of factors
are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemploy-
ment depends on technological conditions. In this line, we suggest
a source of unemployment which diﬀers from the usual sources pro-
vided in the related literature. Then, we state a limit result which
shows that when the market power of trade unions decreases the
corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the
walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We
also provide some examples which illustrate the main results.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation: D51, C72
Key words: Trade union games, unemployment, walrasian equili-
brium, manipulability.
21 Introduction
Manipulability of the walrasian mechanism has been thoroughly studied in the liter-
ature, specially for pure exchange economies. Diﬀerent approaches to manipulability
have been considered, dealing with both cooperative and non cooperative solutions.
Actually, it is well known that by considering misrepresentation either of endow-
ments or preferences or, more generally, demands, agents may have an incentive
to deviate from a competitive behavior and manipulate prices in their own bene-
ﬁt (see, for example, Hurwicz (1972) Roberts and Postlewaite (1976), Postlewaite
(1979), Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990), Safra (1985), Yi (1991), Jackson and Manelli
(1997), Herv´ es, Moreno and P´ ascoa (1999)).
In production economies manipulability of the walrasian mechanism has a partic-
ular signiﬁcance in the light of the theory of imperfect competition. One may hope
to extract from manipulability results and examples some answers to the reasons
for non full employment of factors and, in particular, some contributions to the long
standing debate on the sources of unemployment of labor.
For a long time economists have been concerned with the issue of unemployment,
trying to ﬁnd reasons for such a situation. In a theoretical sense, the reason why
there is unemployment is that the labor market does not clear. The question can be
rephrased so that we can ask why the labor market does not clear or what prevents
the labor market from clearing. In fact, the literature dealing with this point poses
the following question: What are the forces and conditions in the labor market
that prevent real wages to fall down? Although there is no simple answer for this
question, the long standing debate regarding unemployment has focused around
several reasons commonly given as to why the labor market does not clear. These
reasons have been captured essentially by the following theories: eﬃciency wages
theory, sticky wages, minimum wages laws, training costs and imperfect information.
To be more precise:
Firms may not ﬁnd proﬁtable to decrease wages to market clearing levels
because wages are related to marginal productivities through the eﬀort of
workers (see Solow (1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).
Firms may ﬁnd not possible to decrease wages because of diﬀerent arrange-
ments in the bargaining process due to long term relations with workers. De-
pending on this relationship, workers and ﬁrms may arrange wage schemes
that guarantee minimum utility levels (see Leontieﬀ (1946), Barro (1977),
3Hall (1980 and 1982)), or some kind of insurance to protect workers from
ﬂuctuations in the economic activity (see Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and
Gordon (1974)). It could also be the case that not all workers are represented
in the bargaining process; in this case only those workers with a long term
relationship with the ﬁrm would decide, together with the ﬁrm, the level of
employment of temporary workers (see Oswald (1993), Gottfries (1992), Blan-
chard and Summers (1986) and Gregory (1986)).
Institutions could play a role transforming into long term unemployment what
should have otherwise been a reaction to a short term shock (see Bean (1994),
Siebert (1997), Ljungvist and Sargent (1998), Ball (1999) and Blanchard and
Wolfers (1999)).
Diﬀerences in the technical skills required to ﬁll a vacancy with respect to those
endowed in a worker asking for a job (see Pissarides (1985), Howit (1988),
Mortensen (1986), Hosio (1990), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)).
Finally, one may also think that agents do correspond to those in a wal-
rasian economy. In this case all unemployment we observe is due to temporary
changes of job and it is simply a matter of time to adjust to market clearing
conditions.
The aim of this paper is to provide a diﬀerent source for unemployment situations
to those proposed in the literature taking into account strategic behavior (that
is, deviations from the competitive or price-taking behavior) and manipulation of
prices. For this, we consider a production economy where the endowments of factors
are controlled by diﬀerent trade unions. These trade unions behave strategically
on the supplies of inputs. Then, a non-cooperative solution is introduced which
we refer to as trade union equilibrium. Thus, we analyze situations under which
unemployment of factors are supported as trade union equilibria.
More precisely, in this paper we consider a model of production economy in which
the number of factors is ﬁnite and can be used only to produce a consumption
commodity using a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale. Total initial
endowments of factors are controlled by a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent trade unions.
These trade unions behave strategically by supplying an amount of inputs which may
diﬀer from the real initial endowments of factors with the objective of maximizing
the total income of factors under their control. Then, each strategy proﬁle deﬁnes a
new economy which is equal to the real one except for the initial amount of inputs
4which is given by the corresponding strategy proﬁle. Thus, in a ﬁrst stage, unions
declare the amount of inputs to be supplied in the production process, and in a
second stage the walrasian mechanism generates the price vector for the economy
created by the unions. In this line, we associate to a production economy a walrasian
endowment game which we refer to as trade union game whose Nash equilibria are
called trade union equilibria.
We show that the conditions under which trade union equilibria lead to non full
employment of factors are of technological nature. For this kind of unemployment to
exist it is required a certain degree of complementarity of factors in the production
function. If there is no such complementarity, the walrasian equilibrium with perfect
disclosure of total endowments will dominate the solution of our model. Actually,
non full employment of factors could arise as a consequence of the awareness of the
owners of a factor about the impact that a full supply of the factor can have on
prices. Indeed, technology and the awareness of unions about the impact on prices
of undercutting factor supplies are the two key ingredients of this paper.
Following the approach above, we point out that the unemployment situations
depend on the ownership of factors, on the fact that factors have a speciﬁc technical
complementarity and on the market power that the diﬀerent trade unions might
exert to manipulate the factors prices under their control. Then, we conclude that
the unemployment situations depend crucially on technological conditions and the
manipulation of prices of factors. Therefore, we suggest a source of unemployment
which diﬀers from the usual sources provided in the literature.
In particular, trade unions do not declare the total initial endowments of inputs
when they have an incentive to deviate from a competitive behavior, that is, when
they have incentive to manipulate prices. Actually, it is known that manipulation of
prices and strategic considerations are important in small economies where economic
agents may have strong incentives to adopt a non competitive behavior.
On the other hand, there are results which point out that the individual incentive
to deviate from a price taking behavior in ﬁnite pure exchange economies diminishes
as the economy become large. In fact, Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) pioneering
work pointed out that the individual incentive to manipulate equilibrium prices
vanishes as the number of agents in the economy increases inﬁnitely. Subsequently,
Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) analyzed whether true walrasian allocation in ex-
change economies with a large number of agents can be claimed to be suﬃciently
robust against strategic manipulations of agents’ demand maps. Later, Makowski,
Ostroy and Segal (1995) identiﬁed conditions on the richness of the domain of pref-
5erences that allow to characterize eﬃcient and incentive compatible mechanisms
as perfectly competitive. Jackson and Manelli (1997) identiﬁed conditions on the
beliefs of agents under which all market-clearing prices and allocations of the re-
ported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy. More
recently, Lahmandi-Ayed (2001) considers the concept of oligopoly equilibrium, due
to Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991,1993) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), and
shows that the symmetric oligopoly equilibria in pure strategies lead to the compet-
itive equilibrium as the economy is replicated, under uniqueness of the Walras price
equilibrium for any strategy proﬁle.
The conclusion that may be inferred from this literature, dealing with limit results
for pure exchange economies, is that when the number of competitors is large enough
the ability to manipulate prices can be considered negligible. Following this kind
of approach, we obtain a limit result for the production economy that we consider
in our model. Precisely, we show that when the market power of trade unions
decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the
walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. For this, we consider
a sequence of economies by replicating the initial diﬀerent trade unions that share
the total initial amounts of the inputs. Considering again the strategic behavior
of trade unions on the supply of inputs we deﬁne a trade union game associated
to each economy in which the trade unions are replicated. Our limit result points
out the intuitive idea that when a trade union becomes “smaller” the market power
diminishes. Actually, the beneﬁt that a trade union can get by behaving strategically
goes to zero as the size of the trade union decreases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state
the model of a simple production economy. In Section 3, we deﬁne a trade union
game associated to the production economy and we deﬁne the notion of trade union
equilibrium. In Section 4, we show the main results. In Section 5, we present several
examples which illustrate the results stated in this paper.
2 A Walrasian Production Economy
Consider a production economy E with a ﬁnite number n inputs, or factors used to
produce a single commodity considered as numeraire.
Production of the consumption good takes place by means of a technology re-
presented by the production function f : IRn
+ → IR+ with constant returns to scale.
6We assume that f is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and f(0) = 0 (i.e., positive
amount of output requires positive amount of some of the inputs).
There are a ﬁnite number m of consumers in the economy E. Each consumer i is
characterized by an initial endowment of factors ωi and a preference relation i over
the consumption of the unique commodity which is produced in this economy and is
the numeraire. We assume that preferences are continuous and strictly monotone.





k. We assume that z  0. These amounts of inputs have a use only
as production factors (i.e., consumers do not wish to consume them).









Note that in a Walrasian or competitive equilibrium factors are supplied inelas-
tically, that is, there is full employment of every factor; and, therefore, competitive
equilibrium prices are determined by the productive sector.
Then, a competitive equilibrium in the economy E is completely deﬁned by a
price system p∗ = (p∗
1,...,p∗







that is, in a competitive equilibrium each factor is paid its marginal productivity
evaluated at the total endowments of inputs z. Note that the competitive equilibrium
prices depends on the total amount of factors z and not on the precise distribution
of such inputs among consumers.
3 Trade Union Equilibria
Consider the production economy E =





bed in the previous Section, with n factors used to produce a single commodity
considered as numeraire. In this Section, we associate a game to the production
economy E and we deﬁne the non-cooperative solution of trade union equilibrium.
Consider that there are H diﬀerent trade unions and consumers supply inelasti-
cally factors to them. We say that the union h controls the factor j if this union
7has at its disposal, either totally or partially, the initial endowment of factor j, that
is, union h has a positive available amount of factor j. Let Fh 6= ∅ denote the set of
factors controlled by the trade union h and let Hj denote the set of unions which
control the factor j, i.e., the set of unions which own a positive amount of factor j.
Note that j ∈ Fh if and only if h ∈ Hj.
Given a trade union h and a factor j ∈ Fh let zh
j denote the amount of input j
owned by the union h. Since every consumer supplies inelastically her endowment








Fh = {1,...,n}. On the other hand, note that since the cardinality of the
sets Hj can be greater than one, we consider the possibility that a factor can be
controlled by more than one union. Hence, every factor is controlled by at least one
trade union and each trade union may control one or more factors of production.
Remark. If {Fh|h ∈ {1,...,H}} is a partition of {1,...,n} (and then H ≤ n),
we have the particular case in which Fh
T
Fh0 = ∅, that is, every factor is controlled
by only one trade union, and every trade union may control more than one factor of
production. If in addition H = n, we have the situation where every union controls
only one factor which is also a particular case within our setting.
Consider that the objective of trade unions is to maximize the total payments to
their factors. Then, trade unions may have an incentive to behave strategically and
manipulate factor prices in their beneﬁt. In other words, union may have a strategic
incentive to announce not the total amount of factors under their control but only
a fraction and manipulate prices trying to increase the total income share of their
available factors.
The strategic behavior of the diﬀerent trade unions leads to deﬁne the following
game G :












When trade unions declare a strategy proﬁle θ = (θh
k,k ∈ Fh,h ∈ {1,...,H}),
they create a new economy Ez(θ) which coincides with the real economy E except for
the total amount of inputs that is given by z(θ) = (zj(θ))n





8instead of z = (z1,...,zn).
Let p(z(θ)) denote the competitive equilibrium prices for the economy Ez(θ), that
is, pk(z(θ)) = fk(z(θ)) for every factor k; where fk is the marginal product of factor








In this way, given the production economy E, we have considered a trade union
game G which is deﬁned by the strategy sets Sh and the payoﬀ functions Πh, h ∈
{1,...,H}.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Trade Union Equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium for game G.
Therefore, a trade union equilibrium is an amount of the factors under the control
of each union such that no trade union has incentive to change the supply of the
inputs in order to get a greater payoﬀ.
4 Main Results
Given a production economy E we have deﬁned an associated trade union game
G = (Sh,Πh,h = 1,...,H).
Note that the strategy sets Sh are compact and that the payoﬀ function of each
union is continuous. Therefore, applying Glicksberg’s existence theorem (see, for
example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)), we obtain the existence of trade union
equilibria in mixed strategies for the game G. However, we are interested in results
addressing equilibria in pure strategies.
We use the following notation. Let θ be a strategy proﬁle. We denote by θFh the
strategy proﬁle restricted to Fh whereas θ−Fh denotes the strategy proﬁle restricted
to the unions h0 6= h. We write θ = (θFh,z−Fh), where θFh = (θh
j,j ∈ Fh) represents
the amounts of factors which are supplied by the union h via the strategy proﬁle θ
and θ−Fh includes the corresponding amounts of factors which are supplied by the
other diﬀerent unions.
The next result states suﬃcient conditions for existence of pure strategy trade
union equilibria.
9Theorem 4.1 Assume that, for every trade union h and every θ−Fh, the function
Πh(θ−Fh,·) is quasi-concave. Then, the set of trade union equilibria is non empty.
Proof. The strategy set Sh is non empty, convex and compact for every h. Since the
functions Πh(θ−Fh,·) are continuous and quasi-concave, the best response correspon-
dences of the diﬀerent unions take closed and convex values. It remains to apply
Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem to the correspondence whose ﬁxed points coincide
with the set of trade union equilibria.
Q.E.D.
Remark. Let us write Fh = {j1,...jn(h)} and Let Dh
r(·) denote the bordered
Hessian determinants of Πh(θ−Fh,·) for r = 1,...card(Fh), where card(Fh) = n(h)






























































Recall that a necessary condition for Πh(θ−Fh,·) to be quasi-concave is that
(−1)Dh
r(x) ≥ 0 for r = 1,...,n(h) and all x ∈ IR
n(h)
+ ; and a suﬃcient condition
for Πh(θ−Fh,·) to be quasi-concave is that (−1)Dh
r(x) > 0 for r = 1,...,n(h) and
all x ∈ IR
n(h)
+ .
Since the partial derivatives above are given in terms of the partial derivatives of
the production function, we conclude that the quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ functions
is implied by the corresponding properties of the technology.
Note also that since the sum of quasi-concave function, in general, is not quasi-
concave, the quasi-concavity of the function pj(z(θ−Fh,θFh))θh
j on θ−Fh for every
j ∈ Fh does not guarantee the quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ function Πh(θ−Fh,·).
However, if pj(z(θ−Fh,θFh))θh
j is concave on θ−Fh for every j ∈ Fh, then the payoﬀ
function Πh(θ−Fh,·) is also concave and, therefore, is quasi-concave.
Let us consider the particular case in which each union controls only one factor
and each factor is controlled by only one union. In this case we can write a strategy
10proﬁle as θ = (θ1,...,θn) and z(θ) = θ. Thus, the payoﬀ functions are given by








Πh(θ−h,·) is a concave function and, therefore, is quasi-concave.
Taking into account this remark we conclude that the quasi-concavity of the
payoﬀ functions can be implied from the pointed out conditions, which actually are
conditions required on the technology.
Next we provide necessary conditions for a proﬁle θ to be a trade union equili-
brium in terms of the elasticities of demand of factors. For it, let σi,j denote the





. Given a strat-
egy proﬁle θ = (θh





, that is sh
j(z) is
the income share of factor j that union h receives when the factor supplies are given
by the strategy proﬁle θ. Finally, let sj(θ) denote the total income share of factor j









Proposition 4.1 Let θ∗ be a trade union equilibrium such that 0 < θ∗h
j < zh
j for







σj,k(θ∗) = −1 for every factor k ∈ Fh.







Then, the best response curve θ∗
Fh(θ−Fh) = {θ∗h



















Fh,θ−Fh)) for every fac-






sj(θ∗) σj,k(θ∗) = −sk(θ∗) for every union h and every
factor k ∈ Fh are necessary conditions for all the interior trade union equilibria.
Q.E.D.
Note that the result above state necessary conditions for trade union equilibria
where all factors are used but with unemployment of every factor.
Non full employment of factors can be supported as trade union equilibria when
unions have an incentive to deviate from a competitive behavior and manipulate
prices in their own beneﬁt. Thus, following this approach, the degree of unemploy-
ment of factors depends crucially on the market power that unions may have to
manipulate prices (with the aim to increase their income share of the factors under
their control), which in turn depends on technological conditions.
It is well known that strategic considerations are important in small economies in
the sense that economic agents can have strong incentives to manipulate prices by
behaving strategically. On the other hand, a variety of limit results for pure exchange
economies show that the individual incentive to behave strategically diminishes when
the economy become large (see, for instance, Roberts and Postlewaite (1976), Otani
and Sicilian (1982, 1990), Jackson and Manelli (1997), Codognato and Gabszewicz
(1991, 1993), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997)).
Now our aim is to obtain a limit result for the production economy considered
in this paper, which makes precise the intuitive idea that when the market power
of trade unions becomes “smaller” the incentive to behave strategically diminishes
and, therefore, in the limit full employment of factors is attained.
For it, consider a sequence of economies by replicating the initial H diﬀerent trade
unions. For each natural number r let rE be the economy with rH trade unions,
indexed by (h,j). Each trade union (h,j) controls the factors belonging to Fh and
is endowed with the same amount zh
k of every factor k ∈ Fh. Then, in the economy
rE there are r trade unions of type h endowed with the total initial amounts of
the inputs controlled by union h in the economy E. The production function in the
economy rE depends on the aggregate amount of the n factors and is f, i.e., the
same production function as in the initial economy E.




(rz) = fk(rz) = fk(z)
where the last equality follows from the homogeneity of degree zero of fk (which is
12implied by the constant returns of scale). Therefore, the competitive equilibrium
prices for any replicated economy rE are identical and coincide with the competitive
equilibrium prices for the initial economy E.
In each economy rE, trades unions can behave strategically by announcing amounts
of factors under their control, which diﬀer from the real ones. That is, if k ∈ Fh, a
trade union (h,j) can declare an amount of factor k which is less or equal than zh
k.
Considering this strategic behavior of trade unions on the supply of inputs, we
deﬁne the game rG associated to the economy rE as follows:
















Let us denote by θr
k(h,j), the amount of factor k ∈ Fh supplied by the trade
union (h,j) in the economy rE. When trade unions declare a strategy proﬁle θr =
(θr
k(h,j), h = 1,...,H; j = 1,...,r), they create a new economy Eθr which, with
regard to walrasian equilibrium prices, coincides with the economy rE except for the







k(h,j), instead of rz = (rz1,...,rzn). Let p(z(θr)) =
(p1(z(θr)),...,pn(z(θr))) denote the competitive equilibrium prices of factors for
the economy Eθr, that is, pk(z(θr)) = fk(z(θr)) for every factor k; where fk is the
marginal product of factor k in the economy rE. Then, the payoﬀ functions for trade











In this way, for each production economy rE, we have considered a trade union
game rG which is deﬁned by the strategy sets Sr
(h,j), and the payoﬀ functions Πr
(h,j)
with h = 1,...,H and j =,1...,r.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A trade Union Equilibrium for the economy rE is a Nash Equili-
brium for game rG.
We say that a trade union equilibrium θr in the economy rE is symmetric if
θr(h,j) = θr(h,j0) = θr(h) for every j,j0 ∈ {1,...,r} and for every type h of trade
unions.
13That is, a symmetric trade union equilibrium is a trade union equilibrium in which
unions of the same type supply the same amount of factors under their control.
We remark that, alternatively, the game rG can be described in the following way
which is equivalent regarding equilibria:
There are H diﬀerent types of trade unions and r unions of each type. The r
unions of type h have to decide the supply of factors belonging to Fh, that is, the
supply of the factors controlled by this type of trade union. Thus, every union
(h,j), j = 1,...,r proposes an amount yr
k(h,j) ≤ zk for every k ∈ Fh. Then,
it is supplied the average of the proposed amounts, that is, the amount supplied









k(h,j). In this case, the factor
















Next result points out the intuitive idea that when a trade union becomes “smaller”
the market power diminishes. Actually, the beneﬁt that a trade union can get by
behaving strategically goes to zero as the size of the trade union decreases.
Theorem 4.2 For every r let θr be a trade union equilibrium for the economy rE.









converges to z as r increases.
Proof. Suppose that η(θr) does not converge to z. Then, there exist a type h of
trade union, a factor k ∈ Fh and ε > 0 such that, for every r0 there exists r ≥ r0
and a trade union jr of type h such that θr
k(h,jr) < zh
k − ε. Then, we have that
θr
k(h,jr) < zh
k−ε for inﬁnitely many r. For each r, let us consider the strategy proﬁle
αr which coincides with θr except for the trade union (h,jr) that chooses a supply zh
k







converges to zero when r goes
to ∞. On the other hand, since f exhibits constant returns to scale, we have that
pk(z(θr)) = pk(z(θr)/r) and pk(z(αr)) = pk(z(αr)/r). This implies that the prices of
factors depend continuously on the average of the total supplies. By this continuity
property of equilibrium prices, we obtain that for every δ > 0, there exists r(δ)
14such that kp(z(θr)) − p(z(αr))k ≤ δ for every r ≥ r(δ). Since θr
k(h,jr) < zh
k − ε, we
conclude that for r large enough Πr
(h,jr)(αr) > Πr
(h,jr)(θr) which is in contradiction
with the fact that θr is a trade union equilibrium for each r.
Q.E.D.
5 Some Examples of Trade Union Games
5.1 A Simple Game
Let E be a production economy with n = 2 inputs, namely, z1 = K (capital)
and z2 = L (labor) used to produce a single consumption commodity. In this
economy there are a total endowment K of capital and a total endowment L of
labor, supplied inelastically to two diﬀerent trade unions H = {1,2}. That is, we
consider a production economy, where there are only capital and labor as production
factors. All capital K belongs to a union called capitalist union (i.e. , F1 = {1})
while all labor L belongs to a diﬀerent union here called labor union (i.e., F2 = {2}).





−1 + (1 − ε)L
−1
−1
, ε ∈ (0,1).
Both trade unions behave strategically by supplying an amount of the factor
under their control. Thus, the strategy sets for capitalist and labor unions are given
respectively by
S1 = {K, with 0 ≤ K ≤ K}
S2 = {L, with 0 ≤ L ≤ L}
Competition in markets for capital and labor services guarantee that the price
for each factor equates its marginal product. Hence, we have that the corresponding
wage w and rental rate r are given by the next functions:
w(K,L) = (1 − ε)L−2 (εK−1 + (1 − ε)L−1)
−2
r(K,L) = εK−2 (εK−1 + (1 − ε)L−1)
−2
15where K and L are the supplied amount of capital and labor via the strategy
proﬁle (K,L).
The objective function of unions is to maximize total income. Therefore, cap-
ital union best response function K(L) is obtained by maximizing Π1(K,L) =
r(K,L)K, whereas labor union best response function L(K) is obtained by maxi-











K if K > 0
Then, in this example there exists a continuum of Pareto ranked Nash equilibria
in pure strategies, (K,L) given by (1 − ε)K = εL. Therefore if (1 − ε)K < εL,
every Nash Equilibria results in unemployment of labor. On the other hand, if
(1 − ε)K > εL every Nash Equilibrium results in capital unemployment.
























We now analyze the above condition for unemployment of factors. Trade unions
have as an objective to increase their total income; since this increase can only
be done by reducing the supply of the factor under their control, this implies less
production. Therefore, to increase total income for the unemployed factor implies








The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor ηK,L can be written in terms
of the income share, sk and sl, and the elasticity of factor demands σr,K, σw,L as
follows:
ηK,L = (1 − sk)σr,K = (1 − sl)σw,L.
Hence, at any Nash Equilibrium income shares must be equal for both unions. This
is due, basically, to the structure of trade unions and to the elasticity of substitution




Assume now that sk(K,L) > sl(K,L). This means that under competitive equili-
brium (which implies full employment of factors) the share of capital in total income
is larger than the share of labor and, therefore, it cannot be supported as a Nash
Equilibrium and in order to increase the share of labor income it is necessary to
create unemployment of labor. Analogously, if under competitive equilibrium the
17share of labor in total income is larger than the capital share, some unemployment
of capital is necessary to get Nash Equilibria. In fact, in this example, a competitive
equilibrium can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium if and only if sk(K,L) = sl(K,L).
Finally, we remark that for every given ε, Nash Equilibria are Pareto ranked.
Then, it is reasonable, although it is not guaranteed by the Walrasian mechanism,
to think that in case we observe unemployment of a factor there should be full
employment of the other factor. Actually, given any ε, there is a Nash equilibrium
which Pareto dominates all the other Nash equilibria and underlies full employment
of either capital or labor.
5.2 A Generic Trade Union Game
In this section we provide an example of trade union games with a C.E.S. production
function which illustrates the results stated in the previous section and allows us to
explore particular situations of economic interest.
Consider a production economy where a single consumption commodity is pro-
duced according to the following constant returns to scale technology:
F(K1,K2,...,Kn,L) = (ε(K1 + K2 + ... + Kn)
ρ + (1 − ε)L
ρ)
1/ρ
where ε ∈ (0,1), ρ < 0 and n ≥ 1 − ρ.
This technology uses n+1 inputs, with the ﬁrst n factors being perfect substitutes
of capital whereas the last factor is labor. In this economy consumers are endowed
with a total amount K1,...,Kn of the ﬁrst n factors and a total endowment L of
labor. Assume that Ki = k for every i = 1,...,n. Since consumer derive utility
consuming the single produced good, these endowments of factors are supplied in-
elastically to n + 1 diﬀerent trade unions. Then there are H = n + 1 trade unions
each of them controlling one and only one factor. Alternatively, it may be inter-




Ki = nk is equally distributed among n diﬀerent trade unions.
All trade unions behave strategically by supplying an amount of the factor under
their control. Thus, the strategy sets for capital union i and labor union are given
respectively by
18Si = {Ki, with 0 ≤ Ki ≤ k}
S2 = {L, with 0 ≤ L ≤ L}




in markets for capital and labor services guarantee that the price for each factor
equates its marginal product. Hence, we have that the corresponding wage w and
rental rate r are given by the next functions:
w(K,L) = (1 − ε)Lρ−1 (εKρ + (1 − ε)Lρ)
1
ρ−1
r(K,L) = εKρ−1 (εKρ + (1 − ε)Lρ)
1
ρ−1
The objective function of unions is to maximize total factor revenue. There-
fore, capital union i best response function Ki(K−i,L) is obtained by maximizing
Πi(K1,...,Kn,L) = r(K,L)Ki, whereas labor union best response function L(K) is
obtained by maximizing Πn+1(K,L) = w(K,L)L. Actually, best response functions
for the n capital unions are:
Ki(K−i,L) = k for every i = 1,...,n








K if K > 0
Notice that, since 1−ρ < n, every capital union supplies all capital regardless the
strategy choice of other unions. That is, k is a dominant strategy for trade union i =
1,...,n. Therefore, we have a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
given by (k,...,k,min{L,L(K)}). We conclude that when (1 − ε)K
|ρ| < |ρ|εL the
Nash equilibrium results in unemployment of labor.
Finally, we remark that the larger is |ρ| the lower is the elasticity of substitution
between the aggregate of capital K and labor, which in turn, implies higher degree of
complementarity between them. In fact, the larger is |ρ|, the more unemployment of
labor will be observed at the Nash equilibrium. The limit case where the technology
is Leontieﬀ is of particular interest because the condition of unit elasticity of the
factor demand does not hold at any point and will be studied in the next section.
195.3 Trade Union Games with Fixed Factor Proportions
Consider a production economy where a single consumption commodity is produced





min{εK,L} if εK ≥ m and L ≥ m
0 otherwise
where ε is a positive real number.
The total endowment K of capital is controlled by the capital union and the total
endowment L is controlled by the labor union. We assume that min{εK,L} > m,
which guarantees that production is possible.
Both unions behave strategically announcing supplies of factors. Let (K,L) be a
strategy proﬁle. If εK = L the walrasian output is determined by F(K,L) although
walrasian prices are no longer unique. In order to state a well deﬁned game we
consider that when εK = L both unions share total revenue. Then, the payoﬀ
functions for capital and labor unions are deﬁned by:
Π1(K,L) =

     
     
0 if εK > L
aF(K,L) if εK = L
F(K,L) if εK < L
Π2(K,L) =

     
     
F(K,L) if εK > L
(1 − a)F(K,L) if εK = L
0 if εK < L
Observe that, when εK = L, the share of the total income is given by the pa-
rameter a ∈ (0,1). Note that (0,0) is a trivial trade union equilibrium. Actually
every proﬁle (K,L) such that F(K,L) = 0 is a trade union equilibrium. However,
it is easy to see that there is only one trade union equilibrium with production,
independently of the value of a, that is, when walrasian prices are not determined
any share of the income underlies the same trade union equilibrium. This equili-





is the unique trade
20union equilibrium with production, notice that positive income for both unions are
distributed only along the line L = εK, but given any such point, both unions have
incentives to deviate supplying slightly less of their factor, and get all the income.









Regarding this example, a natural question that arises is the following one: how
can we get the maximum production level as result of a trade union equilibrium?
Note that the previous payoﬀ functions present discontinuities which come from
the discontinuity and multiplicity of the walrasian equilibrium price correspondence.
In order to avoid this diﬃculty, let us consider that the payoﬀ functions are deﬁned
as follows:
Π1(K,L) = aF(K,L)
Π2(K,L) = (1 − a)F(K,L)
where a is any positive number between zero and one.
In this case, it is easy to see that any strategy proﬁle which leads to no produc-
tion is a trade union equilibrium. That is, if (K,L) is a strategy proﬁle such that
min{εK,L} ≤ m, then, (K,L) is a trade union equilibrium. On the other hand, we
have also a set of union equilibrium with production. Moreover, (K,L) is a trade
union equilibrium. In other words, full employment of factors can be reached as a
Nash equilibrium for this game where the payoﬀ functions are continuous.
In order to deﬁne all the trade union equilibria with production, we distinguish
several situations:
21If L < εK, then the set of union equilibria with production is the following one:
{(K,L) | L = εK, F(K,L) > 0}
[ n
(K,L | L ≤ εK
o









































Case (i) L < εK
If L > εK, then the set of union equilibria with production is the following one:
{(K,L) | L = εK, F(K,L) > 0}
[ n
(K,L) | L ≥ εK
o



























# # Case (ii) L > εK
22Finally, note that when L = εK, we can conclude that (K,L) not only is a trade
union equilibrium but also Pareto dominates all the other union equilibria.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have deﬁned union games associated to production economies
within a general equilibrium framework. The objective of each trade union is to
maximize the total amount of revenues of factors under its control. Then, union
behave strategically on the supply of inputs in order to manipulate prices in their
own beneﬁt.
We remark that the structure of unions we have stated is general enough to allow
us to consider interesting situations as particular cases.
We have analyzed trade union equilibria regarding non full employment of factors.
The results obtained along the paper point out a source of unemployment, which
depends on technological condition and union structure, and therefore diﬀers from
those usually considered in the literature.
An important caveat of our model we want to stress is the fact for each economy
with non full employment of factors, generated by a Union Game, there exists an
economy with no unemployment and exactly the same prices and the same utiliza-
tion of inputs. This might be important for simulation purposes. We can calibrate
an economy using National Accounts and the insights of competitive general equili-
brium, incorporating unemployment of factors in the parameters of the production
function.
Since the players are unions and not consumers, a problem which is not addressed
in our analysis is the distribution of income from factors to the consumers. It seems,
however, reasonable to assume a proportional distribution with respect to the initial
endowment of factors. The process of Union formation and their stability is out of
the scope of this paper, but it is in our agenda for future research.
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